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O'BRIEN V. CUNARD S.S. CO., LIMITED
(Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
Suffolk. Sept. 1, 1891.)
Exceptions from superior court, Suffolk county.
Action of tort by Mary E. O'Brien against Cunard Steam-Ship Company,
Limited. Judgment for defendant. Plaintiff brings exceptions. Exceptions
overruled.
E.N. Hill and Frederic Cunningham, for plaintiff. Geo. Putnam and
Thos. russell, for defendant.
KNOWLTON, J. This case presents two questions: First, Whether there
was any evidence to warrant the jury in finding that the defendant, by any of
its servants or agents, committed an assault on the plaintiff; secondly, whether
there was evidence on which the jury could have found that the defendant was
guilty of negligence towards the plaintiff. To sustain the first count, which
was for an alleged assault, the plaintiff relied on the fact that-the surgeon who
was employed by the defendant vaccinated her on ship-board, while she was
on her passage from Queenstown to Boston. On this branch of the case the
question is whether there was any evidence that the surgeon used force upon
the plaintiff against her will. In determining whether the act was lawful or
unlawful, the surgeon's conduct must be considered in connection with the
surrounding circumstances. If the plaintiff's behavior was such as to indicate
consent on her part, he was justified in his act, whatever her unexpressed
feelings may have been. In determining whether she consented, he could be
guided only be her overt acts and the manifestations of her feelings. Ford v.
Ford, 143 Mass. 578, 10 N. E. Rep. 474: McCarthy v. Railroad Corp., 148
Mass. 550, 552, 20 N E. Rep. 182. It is undisputed that at Boston there are
strict quarantine regulations in regard to the examination of emigrants, to see
that they are protected from small-pox by vaccination, and that only those
persons who hold a certificate from the medical officer of the steam-ship,
stating that they are so protected, are permitted to land without detention in
quarantine, or vaccination by the port physician. It appears that the defendant
is accustomed to have its surgeons vaccinate all emigrants who desire it, and
who are not protected by previous vaccination, and give them a certificate
which is accepted at quarantine as evidence of their protection. Notices of the
regulations at quarantine, and of the willingness of the ship's medical officer
to vaccinate such as needed vaccination, were posted about the ship in various
language, and on the day when the operation was performed the surgeon had
a right to presume that she and the other women who were vaccinated
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understood the importance and purpose of vaccination for those who bore no
markes to show that they were protected. By the plaintiff's testimony, which,
in this particular, is undisputed, it appears that about 200 women passengers
were assembled below, and she understood from conversation with them that
they were to be vaccinated; that she stood about 15 feet from the surgeon, and
saw them form in aline, and pass in turn before him; that he "examined their
arms, and, passing some of them by, proceeded to vaccinate those that had no
mark;" that she did not hear him say anything to any of them; that upon being
passed by they each received a card, and went on deck; that when her turn
came she showed him her arm; he looked at, and said there was no mark, and
that she should be vaccinated; that she told him she had been vaccinated
before, and it left no mark; "that he then said nothing; that he should
vaccinate her again;" that she held up her arm to be vaccinated; that no one
touched her; that she did not tell him she did not want to be vaccinated; and
the she took the ticket which he gave her, certifying that he had vaccinated
her, and used it at quarantine. She was one of a large number of women who
were vaccinated on that occasion without, so far as appears, a word of
objection from any of them. They all indicated by their conduct that they
desired to avail themselves of the provisions made for their benefit. There
was nothing in the conduct of the plaintiff to indicate to the surgeon that she
did not wish to obtain a card which would save her from detention at
quarantine, and to be vaccinated, if necessary, for that purpose. Viewing his
conduct in the light of the surrounding circumstances, it was lawful; and there
was no evidence tending to show that it was not. The ruling of the court on
this part of the case was correct. The plaintiff contends that, it if was lawful
for the surgeon to vaccinate her, the vaccination was negligently performed.
"There was no evidence of want of care or precaution by the defendant in the
selection of the surgeon, or in the procuring of the virus or vaccine matter."
Unless there was evidence that the surgeon was negligent in performing the
operation, and unless the defendant is liable for this negligence, the plaintiff
must fail on the second count.
Whether there was any evidence of negligence of the surgeon we need
not inquire, for we are of opinion that the defendant is not liable for his want
of care in per-[*267]forming surgical operations. The only ground on which
it is argued that the defendant is liable for his negligence is that he is a
servant engaged in the defendant's business, and subject to his control. We
think this argument is founded on a mistaken construction of the duty imposed
on the defendant by law. By the fifth section of the act of congress of August
2, 1882, (22 U.S. St. at Large, 188,) is provided that "every steam-ship or
other vessel carrying or bringing emigrant passengers, exceeding fifty in
number, shall carry a duly competent and qualified surgeon or medical
practitioner, who shall be rated as such in the ship's articles, and who shall
be provided with surgical instruments, medical comforts, and medicines proper
and necessary for diseases and accidents incident to sea voyages, and for the
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proper medical treatment of such passengers during the voyage, and with such
articles of food and nourishment as may be proper and necessary for
preserving the health of infants, and young children; and the services of such
surgeon or medical practitioner shall be promptly given in any case of
sickness or disease to any of the passengers or to any infant or young child
of any such passengers, who may need his services. For a violation of either
of the provisions of this section the master of the vessel shall be liable to a
penalty not exceeding two hundred and fifty dollars." Under this statute it is
the duty of the ship-owners to provide a competent surgeon, whom the
passengers may employ, if they choose, in the business of healing their
wounds, and curing their diseases. The law does not put the business of
treating sick passengers into the charge of common carriers, and make them
responsible for proper management of it. The work which the physician or
surgeon does in such cases is under the control of the passengers themselves.
It is their business, not the business of the carrier. They may employ the
ship's surgeon, or some other physician or surgeon who happens to be on
board, or they may treat themselves if they are sick, or may go without
treatment if they prefer; and, if they employ the surgeon, they may determine
how far they will submit themselves to his directions, and what of his
medicines they will take and what reject, and whether they will submit to a
surgical operation or take the risk of going without it. The master or owners
of the ship cannot interfere in the treatment of the medical officer when he
attends a passenger. He is not their servant, engaged in their business, and
subject to their control as to his mode of treatment. They do their whole duty
if they employ a duly qualified and competent surgeon and medical
practitioner, and supply him with all necessary and proper instruments,
medicines, and medical comforts, and have him in readiness for such
passengers as choose to employ him. This is the whole requirement of the
statue of the United States applicable to such cases; and if, by the nature of
their undertaking to transport passengers by sea, they are under a liability at
the common law to make provision for their passengers in this respect, that
liability is no greater. It is quite reasonable that the owners of a steam-ship
used in the transportation of passengers should be required by law to provide
a competent person to whom sick passengers can apply for medical treatment,
and when they have supplied such a person it would be unreasonable to hold
them responsible for all the particulars of his treatment when he is engaged
in the business of other persons, in regard to which they are powerless to
interfere. The reasons on which it is held in the courts of the United States
and of Massachusetts that the owners are liable for the negligence of a pilot
in navigating the ship, even though he is appointed by public agencies, and
the master has no voice in the selection of him, do not apply to this case. The
Chine, 7 Wall. 53-67; Yates v. Brown, 8 Pick. 23. The pilot is engaged in the
navigation of the ship, for which, on grounds of public policy, the owners
should be held responsible. The business is theirs, and they have certain
1992]
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rights of control in regard to it. They may determine when and how it shall
be undertaken, and the master may displace the pilot for certain causes. But
in England it has been held that even in such case the owners are not liable.
Carruthers v. Sydebotham. 4 Maule & S. 88: The Maria, Id. 95. The view
which we have taken of this branch of the case is fully sustained by a
unanimous judgement of the court of appeals of New York in Laubheim v.
DeKoninglyke N.S. C., 107 N.Y. 228, 13 N. E. Rep. 781. See, also, Secord
v. Railway C., 18 Fed. Rep. 221; McDonald v. Hospital, 120 Mass. 432. We
are of opinion that on both parts of the case the rulings at the trial were
correct. The evidence excepted to was rightly admitted. Exceptions
overruled.
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